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Measuring Voter Lines
Carsten Schu¨rmann, IT University of Copenhagen
Jian Wang, IT University of Copenhagen
We present an automated data collection technique called white boxes- or simply wb-technique, that is designed
— to analyze the voter behavior in polling stations, which includes the measurement of arrival and waiting times, the deter-
mination of arrival frequency and multiple arrival;
— to assist the management of polling places to make decision regarding the distribution of resources, and to identify areas
for future improvement;
— to collect historical data to evaluate the impact of redistricting and gerrymandering on the quality of the voting experience;
— and to provide hard data to guide the political decision making process with respect to the choice of voting technologies.
1. INTRODUCTION
The question of how to improve the voters’ experience when going to the polls is of central im-
portance to many electoral managment bodies (EMBs). Good voter experience is often associated
with an efficient and professionally organized electoral process, which in turn is expected to lead
to elevated levels of voter participation, voter satisfaction, and also trust in the overall election and
its outcome. In a recently published report by the US Presidential Commission on Election Ad-
ministration on the American Voting Experience [Bauer and Ginsberg 2014], for example, one of
the recommendations calls for state-of-the-art techniques to assure efficient management of polling
places, including tools the Commission is publicizing and recommending for the efficient alloca-
tion of polling place resources. Such state-of-the-art techniques can be roughly divided into two
categories: techniques that render polling places more efficient and techniques that measure polling
place efficiency. Denmark, for example, uses digital voter registration systems to increase efficiency:
By presenting a voter registration with a machine readable barcode, voters can be quickly and effi-
ciently checked of the electoral roll.
This paper presents a state-of the-art technique for analyzing the efficiency of a polling place by
measuring the times voters are present in and around a polling place. This analysis technique is
called the white boxes- or simply wb-technique. The results of the wb-technique are datasets from
which we can infer information, for example, when a voter arrived at the polling place, when he
or she left. Using statistics, we can deduce valuable information that can assist administrators to
render polling places more efficient. Examples of the effects of such a method include: Reallocating
resources from one polling station to another in the case that there is a demographic change; pur-
chasing new equipment, such as new ballot boxes, additional registration desks, voting machines or
curtains, with the goal to shorten long waiting times; it may also lead to restructuring the layout of
polling places to improve flow; or collecting statistical information to quantify voting culture, for
example, how many voters skip out of a voting line and leave, how many return again, and how many
remain in the polling place after they cast the ballot to wait for friends or chat with acquaintances.
With every redistribution of resources, there is some risk that the quality of the election decreases
instead of increases. There are reports from US elections, for example, that after gerrymandering
some polling places experienced extremely long waiting times, such as for example, during the
2012 presidential election in Richland County [Buell 2013]. The data that we collect at polling
places can be used to understand these problems better and evaluate the effectiveness of counter
measures. It can be used to justify expenses towards more efficient polling place administration
and to disarm arguments based on circumstantial evidence, for example unsubstantiated complaints
about excessive waiting times.
This work is supported by the National Science Foundation, under grant CNS-0435060, grant CCR-0325197 and grant
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In the US, there is a critical awareness that such data is invaluable. Per recommendation of the
CalTech/MIT voting project, several precincts have already collected or are planning to collect
queuing data the old fashioned way, i.e. by having election officials count the number of people
standing in line in regular intervals; or by handing out pieces of paper to voters that are stamped
with arrival and eventually also the departure times; and by tracking individuals throughout the
voting process, marking the arrival times at individual service points. In this paper we show that
our wb-technique, is on all accounts superior to the manual counting: It is more reliable in that it is
virtually free of human error; it is more consistent as information is continuously recorded; it permits
(at least in theory) the reconstruction of the path of individual voters through the polling station by
trilateralization and it is unobtrusive, because sensors can be installed in the polling place out of
sight of the polling officials and voters. Furthermore, in this paper we show, that the wb-technique
and the manually collected data can be correlated. In this paper we show, that it is possible to replace
the manual collection of queuing data by a technological solution, while improving the accuracy of
the measurement.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the white box-technique. The hard-
ware and software that we chose to implement the technique are described in Section 3. Security and
privacy considerations are discussed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We describe a pilot study with
this technology that we conducted during the 2015 Danish parliamentary election in Section 6. We
deployed the technology in five polling stations including three in Copenhagen and two in Aarhus.
For one polling place in Copenhagen, Holbergskolen, we conducted CalTech/MIT style manual col-
lection of inflow data, which we use to evaluate the quality of our method. Finally, we assess results
and describe our preliminary findings in Section 7. We conclude that the white box method provides
a precise and accurate information to measure waiting times in polling places.
Legal Concerns. According to Danish data protection agency Datatilsynet, the media access con-
trol (MAC) adress is considered sensitive (personenfølsom) information, which means it is protected
by data protection laws. Recording of this information is only legal if permitted by Datatilsynet. The
DemTech project has received permission from the Danish data protection agency to record this data
for scientific purposes.
2. WHITE BOXES-TECHNIQUE
The basic idea behind this technique, is that mobile phones send out wireless packets that can be
recorded by a sensor for future analysis. Abstractly, we can describe the data collected this way by
as a set of observations O, that records wireless packets in the form of pairs
(p, t) ∈ O
where p denotes the identifier of a mobile phone and t the time at which a wireless packet was
observed. The sensors that record the packets sent out by mobile phones have only limited range.
Therefore, it will become necessary to deploy multiple sensors for one polling station, which entails,
that we will also have to combine multiple sets of observations O1, . . . ,On for our analysis. To
compute for how long a mobile phone, aka voter was present at a polling place, we have to combine
the sets of observations and compute the following presence relation:
(p,s,e) ∈ Presence(O)
where s (e) refers to the earliest (latest) time when (p,s) ((p,e)) was recorded in O. In other words,
we can compute precisely for how long each device stayed in a polling place — by subtracting s
from e.
Noise: In our pilot study that we describe below in Section 6, we have observed that empirically
collected data sets contain noise. This noise may be due to other devices emitting wireless packets,
such as, for example, routers that are installed in the building hosting the polling station, mobile
phones of voting officials or people passing by without voting, or mobile phones of voters that
run out of batteries. We remove the noise from the dataset using common statistical methods, in
Technology Range
RFID tracking < 1m
Bluetooth tracking ca. 10m
WiFi tracking < 100m
UTMS, GSM 800m−40km
Fig. 1. Tracking Technologies
particular, one standard deviation, which is defined as follows.
σ=
√
E[(T −µ)2]
where µ = E[T ] computes the expected value. Data outside the range of [µ−σ,µ+σ] is treated as
noise.
Accuracy: Each sensor, will accurately record any wireless packet observed within its range,
assuming that the local clock of the sensor is configured correctly. This has two consequences.
First, if the waiting queue extends outside the range of a sensors installed, it will not “see” the end
of a line, and conversely, a mobile phone may be detected while the voter is still in progress of
enqueuing. In the former case, it is important that the voting officials can predict where the line will
form and then use sufficiently many sensors to monitor the queue. In the latter case, it might be
possible to compensate for this mathematically, but for the purpose of this paper we have decided
not to look into it any further. This means, that in comparison with manually recorded waiting data,
our graphs are slightly more conservative.
Completeness: We note, that not every voter will carry a mobile phone that emits packets. In our
experience, this is not problematic, because of the way lines are formed, as long as sufficiently many
people in line carry such a phone. Our data shows, that most commonly every third to fourth voter
(in extreme cases every eighth voter) carries such a phone. Naturally, the more mobile phones are
present in a voting place, the more accurate our estimates for waiting times will become.
We also note, that the frequency with which mobile phones emit packets depends very much on
the phone’s operating system. This is because the probe frequency, for example, for WiFi ranges
from 4 packets per minute to less than one.
We anticipate a future complication with the wb-technique when phones come pre-configured
with an anonymization enabled. This technique hides the device identifier of the phones during
the probing phase. However, this is currently not a concern, as only few phones have this feature
enabled [Motorola Solutions 2014], in part, because it is so inconvenient to enable it. All notification
services, email, messages, etc. must be disabled for this feature to work.
3. IMPLEMENTATION
Next, we describe our design choices for implementing the wb-technique, in preparation for a real
election.
3.1. Hardware
The first design choice is about which kind of wireless packets we intend to record. There are
several options as outlined in Figure 1. Among these options, we have selected WiFi tracking: Most
smartphones and smartwatches have active WiFi on their phones, simply because of convenience.
This way the phone will try to connect automatically to an access point at home or in the office.
When trying to connect, the smartphone periodically emits a probing packet, which we will then
record. The range of WiFi phones in the open is around 100m, indoors between 10 and 20m and
is therefore better than Bluetooth, which has a much smaller range. In addition many more people
use their smartphones to connect to access points than have Bluetooth enabled. We briefly also
considered RFID tracking, but discarded this idea because of low range and security concerns.
Recording UMTS or GSM signals is in general illegal.
WiFi enabled devices usually transmit on 11 different channels. When trying to connect to an
access point they transmit a broadcast packet on all channels, which means that for our system, it is
sufficient to listen only to one channel (channel 1) which uses a frequency of 2412 MHz. Note, that
the mobile phone has also Bluetooth enabled, there might be some interference between WiFi and
Bluetooth.
The second design choice is about the particular technology that we shall use to record wireless
packets. There are many possibilities, ranging from small computers (for example, Raspberry Pi)
to routers. In preliminary experiments, we used a TP link travel router TP-MR3020.1 These routers
have the advantage that we can install OpenWRT (a Linux derivative) on them. They also come with
a USB port, which we use to connect a USB drive to record the data persistently, which we found
worked well. We also used USB drives in an earlier pilot Danish Municipal election 2013, without
any problems.
An alternative technology are 3G antennas, that we used for the European parliament election
2014, where we encrypted and transmitted the data directly to DemTech’s server. This had the
advantage that in principle, we could provide online queuing data information, however, the 3G
connection to the server was less reliable than expected, so that our data collection was spotty at
best.
One drawback of these sensors was that they needed to be connected to an external power source,
which means that the location for the sensors in a polling place was largely determined by the
location of power outlets.
For the 2015 Danish Parliamentary election we therefore started to look for another technology
and we chose the TP link travel router TP-MR13U2 and 16GB SanDisk Cruzer Fit USB Flash drives.
This router comes with an embedded battery large enough to power the sensor for 48 hours straight,
ample of time to be deployed during an election. Just like with the TP-MR3020, OpenWRT can be
installed on this sensor and they can be programmed to start and stop collecting data at precise time
points. Practically speaking a polling station can be prepared the day before the election, and the
sensors can be collected after the polling station closes.
3.2. Software
To prepare the routers, we flushed the router’s firmware and replaced it by OpenWRT 3, a version
of the Linux kernel that is optimized for network traffic management. Next, we set the wireless
interface of each sensor into passive mode, which means that the sensors can only listen. One can
think of the sensors as microphones, recording all wireless traffic around them.
OpenWRT supports many of the common networking tools,in particular, tcpdump4 a tool that we
configured to record all wireless traffic. We configured the sensors in such a way that they would
automatically start recording packets at 08:00 and stop at 21:00 on the election day.
4. SECURITY
We review the security of our system from the point of assets and vulnerabilities [Basin et al. 2009]
in the polling places. In our experiments, the physical assets are the routers and their respective USB
drives. The physical assets’ integrity can be violated due to unexpected damage to the sensors, for
example, through water, fire, or theft. As logical assets we refer to the router’s software and the data
collected on the USB flash drive.
Regarding the protection of the physical assets, there is little we can do beyond physical securing
them, because the sensors are not monitored. During the experiments described below, we placed
the routers in difficult to access places and out of the voters sight.
1http://www.tp-link.com/en/products/details/cat-4691 TL-MR3020.html
2http://wiki.openwrt.org/toh/tp-link/tl-mr13u
3https://openwrt.org/
4http://www.tcpdump.org/
We therefore direct the focus of this security analysis on the integrity and security of the logical
assets. Here, we even assume that the sensor itself is under the adversary’s control, and therefore
as the primary security mechanism we protect all data on the USB flash drive, by encrypting the
relevant partition on the drive. The key for decrypting the flash drive was not stored on the sensor,
but kept in our office.
As a secondary security mechanism, we restrict the attack surface of each sensor: the only way
to access it is by attaching network cable and logging in through ssh.
The only personnel authorized to access are the system administrators, who are usually not in
field. A system administrator has all keys and thus has the access to all critical data. We argue that
the system is secure keeping in mind that an attacker could easily record the same wireless traffic
without having to breach the security measures that we have put into place.
Next, we’ll address the protection of the collected data. Each recorded packet contains identifying
information about the identity of the mobile phone, the so called MAC address. Even though it is
possible to reset the MAC address of any such device, it is uncommon for users to do so. Note, that
for the purpose of this work, it is important, that
— MAC addresses are properly anonymized to protect the identity of the voter,
— only data relevant to our experiments is kept, including anonymized MAC addresses, time stamps,
and signal noise ratios, and
— the anonymization of mac addresses is deterministic, because we need to correlate packets across
multiple sensors.
For practical purposes, during the voting day, all data is recorded. Any anonymization and analysis
of the data is done post-election.
The data collected during this pilot must be classified as “sensitive” because MAC addresses are
considered personal data. To do an appropriate security analysis of our design, we consider which
possible adversary may be interested in stealing the data we collect. An adversary may want
— to steal data out of curiosity,
— to gain access to recorded information,
— to discredit the election commission,
— or to interrupt the pilot.
It is therefore important to take the necessary technical and operational security precautions.
However, in general, the security threat is at most moderate, as many polling places are within the
range of wireless routers that could be reprogrammed to collect similar kinds of information. Every
smart phone can be programmed to do the same.
We use disk encryption (AES based, SHA1, 256 bit) to deter attackers and to secure the data
stored on the USB drive on the sensor. The disk encryption subsystem is part of the Linux kernel
(dm -crypt). This way, we can guarantee that all data on the USB drive is encrypted and thus
rendered useless for an attacker stealing it.
5. PRIVACY
The MAC address for a network interface, is factory preset for each networked device. This includes
smartphones, but also standard networking hardware that can be found in laptops and other comput-
ers. A MAC address contains 6 octets, where the first 3 octets identify the organization that issued
this MAC. Together with the rest 3 octets, it is possible to identify the device that owns the MAC,
which may lead to a breach in privacy. For most devices, in particular Apple’s iPhone or Android
phones, the MAC address can be reset by the user to any randomly chosen 6 octets 5. For exam-
ple c2:31:9d:d0:30:e8 is a valid MAC address. As each octet is 8 bit, there are 248 unique MAC
addresses. Standard anonymization techniques, for example, by computing the SHA256 digest for
MAC from a voters phone provide only low levels of security, because a simple dictionary attack
5Some special MACs are reserved
would allow an adversary to relate the anonymized identifier to the original MAC address. So we
chose to use HMAC (keyed-hash message authentication code) to hide the MAC before we publish
the raw data, where the HMAC key protects against the dictionary attack.
For reasons of reliability, when we use tcpdump to capture the wireless packets, we do not filter
out the packet header during recording. Instead, we stored the whole packet, and remove the packets
body offline. The secrecy of each packet’s content depends on the type of security method used for
wireless communication, for example WEP, WPA, or WPA2. In addition, most voters will not be
able to connect to any of the local networks in the polling station, which means all the captured
packets will only be handshake beacons, instead of payload carrying network packets, that arise
when checking email or surfing the web.
Our security and privacy measurements are not designed to protect against inside attacks, which
means if the keys are misused by an inside attacker, the attacker may gain free access to the data on
the USB drive and recover the original MAC addresses from the anonymized ones. If the attacker
is in possession of the secret key used to compute the HMAC, he will be able to brute force the
original MAC address.
6. FIELD STUDY
In this section we describe the 2015 pilot project, where we recorded network traffic using the white
boxes method and recorded them manually following the CalTech/MIT style.
The general parliament election was held in Denmark on 18 June 2015 from 09:00 to 20:00 to
elect the 179 members of the Folketing (Danish parliament). We installed our white box technology
in 5 polling places in two cities, Aarhus and Copenhagen, and deployed in total 18 white boxes with
a minimum of 3 white boxes installed in each each polling station. Out of the 5 polling places, 3
were located in Copenhagen, which are Holbergskolen, Bellahøj Skole and Islands Brygge Skolen,
and 2 were located in Aarhus, which are Møllevangskolen and Frederiksbjerg Hallerne.
6.1. Installation
The position for each white box in a polling place was carefully chosen, in an effort to ensure that all
white boxes together cover the entire polling station and the area where there queues were expected
to form. In some polling places we placed white boxes in such a way to achieve a higher level of
redundancy, useful for the case when a sensor fails. As shown in Figure 2a, 3 sensors were placed in
Holbergskolen polling place in Copenhagen, where the bottom two sensors are placed to record the
mobile devices before voters go through the entrance (IND) and after they leave (UD). The small
circles mark the registration desks, the first service point. After registration, the voters received a
blank ballot and proceeded to the second service point, waiting for an empty voting booth, which
are marked in Figure 2a by a crossed out circle. The queues formed alongside the building, along
the dotted line in the picture.
(a) Holbergskolen (b) Islands Brygge Skolen
(c) Bellahøj Skole
Fig. 2. Layout Maps of White Boxes in Copenhagen
On the day before the election, we deployed five teams who visited one of the five polling places
each, and installed 3-4 sensors. The sensors were programmed to record from 08:00 to 21:00. The
sensors were completely autonomous and did not require any servicing during election day. Each
team collected the sensors after close of polling station and returned them to the lab for further
processing.
6.2. Data Preprocessing
The data collected by each sensor consists of a list of packets. These lists contain several millions of
packets each. Each packet is described by a time stamp, an anonymized MAC address, and a value
representing signal strength.
Figure 3 depicts a plot of one of these sensors, before noise was removed. The x axis describes
time and the y axis the identifier of the mobile phone, sorted in order of first appearance. As we
can see, several sensors leave long lines to the right; this may be due to routers in proximity to the
polling station being turned on, or other reasons.
First, we tweak the data a little:
(1) We preprocess the data in the following format, summarizing all observations at times t1...tn
of the same identifier into one tuple (p,{t1, . . . , tn}, l). l refers to the duration an identifier was
within scope of the polling station l = tn− t1.
(2) We remove all tuples from this set, where l = 0.
(3) We remove all tuples, where 60min < l.
(4) We remove all tuples, recorded 30min before the polling station opens, i.e. where t1 < 08:30.
(5) We remove all tuples, recorded 30min after the polling station closes, i.e. where 20:30< tn.
(6) We remove all tuples corresponding to spurious identifiers, where l < 1min.
(7) We remove all tuples corresponding to transient identifiers, i.e. there exists an i, such that
10min < ti+1− ti.
(8) Finally, we apply the noise removal techniques described earlier, which significantly improved
the overall quality of the data. With a running average (deviation) µ (σ) of the duration l for
10 minute intervals (empirically determined), we remove in addition all those tuples for which
l < µ−σ or µ+σ< l.
It is also conceivable to preprocess the data set even further: For example, for each wireless
packet, we could determine the manufacturer information (before anonymization) and based on this
information, we could decide to keep the tuple or remove it. This is possible, because the first 24 bits
of a MAC address identifies the manufacturer as discussed in Section 5 (unless the MAC address
was reset). There are online inverse MAC-address lookup services.
When we black-listed the five common router manufacturers, in particular CISCO, TP-LINK,
DLINK, MicrosoftServer, and Netgear, and removed all packets from those devices from our data
set, we observed, that our method produced nearly identical results. This means, that our data pro-
cessing step effectively removes all black-listed devices automatically.
We also observed, that our sensors sometimes behave erratically. The sensor No.7’s unprocessed
data depicted in the Figure 3, for example, appeared to have malfunctioned as it stopped recording
packets for about one hour. The damage could be mitigated, because the other sensors in polling
places worked well. We remark, that this was also the only malfunctioning that we observed.
Fig. 3. White Box No.7 Data
6.3. Devices
In Denmark, it is common practice to publish statistical information about each election on the
internet. The official election homepage [Danmarks Statistik 2015], for example, lists how many
voters voted in each polling place. We use this information to approximate, how many voters carried
a WiFi enabled mobile phone (see Figure 6.3). The overall penetration of smart phones in Denmark
was 59% in 2013 6.
Polling Places Voters Devices Percentage
Holbergskolen 4997 1333 26.68%
Bellahøj Skole 5789 1942 33.55%
Islands Brygge Skolen 7931 3494 44.05%
Møllevangskolen 8043 3132 38.94%
Frederiksbjerg Hallerne 10578 3798 35.90%
Fig. 4. Device Capture Ratio
6.4. Queues
We show now how to interpret the data that we have collected using the polling station at Islands
Brygge Skolen as example. The results for the other polling places is given in the Appendix A,
Appendix B and Appendix C.
First, we visualize the data we have collected. Recall, that our data set consists of a set of tuples
of the form (p, t1, tn, l), where p stands for the anonymized identifier of each mobile phone, t1 the
point in time when the device was detected first, and tn when it was seen last. Below we refer to
this data set as D . l refers to the total voter’s waiting time (time spend in the polling place). The
graph in Figure 20 visualizes this — the vertical axis ranges over device IDs ordered by t1, and the
horizontal axis ranges over time. For each device, we mark t1 by a blue and tn by a red dot.
Fig. 5. Device Appearance in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
6https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of countries by smartphone penetration
Next, we describe two analysis techniques, for computing the average time that voters spent in
a polling place. First, we use the method of averaging, which is described in Section 6.4.1, and
second, we use a method based on Little’s theorem [Little 1961] in Section 6.4.2.
6.4.1. Method based on averaging. With this method, we compute the running averages of the
time spent in a polling place, using a sliding window of 10 minutes, 30 minutes, and 1 hour, respec-
tively:
µlen(t) =
∑l∈L l
|L|
where L is defined as {l|(p, t1, tn, l)∈D and t− len2 ≤ t1 ≤ t+ len2 } and len is the size of the window.
Figure 6 depicts a green, blue, and red graph for the polling place at Islands Brygge Skolen repre-
senting the running averages for a 10 minute, 30 minute, and one hour window, respectively. The
horizontal axis denotes time and ranges from 08:30 to 20:30. The vertical axis denotes the average
waiting time, in seconds.
Fig. 6. Average Time (Averaging Method) in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
6.4.2. Method based on Little’s theorem. In queuing theory, Little’s theorem is widely applied.
Little’s theorem states [Little 1961]: ”The average number of customers in a system (over some
interval) is equal to their average arrival rate, multiplied by their average time in the system.”
Based on this theorem, we can compute the average time the voters spent in the polling station as
µlen(t) =
Vlen(t)
λlen(t)
,
where len stands for the size of the window, as above. Vlen is the average number of voters in the
polling station at time t, and λlen is the arrival rate also at time t.
The accumulated inflow values, outflow values, and their difference, which corresponds to the
number of voters present in the polling station at a particular time, are plotted in in Figure 7. The
grey, green, and blue graphs, correspond to inflow, outflow, and number of voters, respectively.
Figure 8 shows the average time voters spent in the Islands Brygge Skolen polling station for
any particular point in time during the voting day. The color schemes are consistent with those used
Fig. 7. Device Flow in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
above, green refers to a 10 minute window, blue to a 30 minute window, and red to a one hour
window.
Fig. 8. Average Time (Little’s Method) in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
6.5. Manual Count
In order to validate our method, we conducted in addition to the automatic method a manual count
in parallel, following the CalTech/MIT recommendations, for assessing waiting times in polling
places. In this section, we report which data we collected, and how to compare the white box method
with the manual method. The CalTech/MIT recommendation proposes two different kinds of manual
data collection.
(1) The method asks an observer to follow and record the individual activities of each voter through-
out the polling station. This includes, arrival times, for example, at the end of the queue, or
different service points, and the departure of the voter from the polling station. Figure 9 depicts
a fragment of the log that we manually recorded at the polling station, called Holbergskolen.
No. Description Check-in Arrival
registration
Leave
registration
Enter
booth
Leave
booth
Ballot cast
16 green coat 10:51:40 10:53:00 10:53:15 10:53:24 10:54:09 10:54:14
17 purple jacket 10:59:45 11:00:35 11:00:51 11:00:57 11:02:00 11:02:11
18 lime jacket 11:10:06 11:10:58 11:11:20 11:11:30 11:12:22 11:12:28
19 red coat 11:19:10 11:19:24 11:19:40 11:19:48 11:20:26 11:20:28
20 white pants 11:28:10 11:28:30 11:28:44 11:28:46 11:29:16 11:29:20
Fig. 9. Example Data of Manual Count in Holbergskolen
(2) The second method for data collection requires an observer to count the number of arriving vot-
ers in 10 minute intervals. The two leftmost columns of Tables 15–17 display this information
for 4 different polling places. Due to the lack of observers, we were not able to record this data
for the polling station at Frederiksbjerg Hallerne.
Next, we discuss the comparison between the white box method and the manual methods.
6.5.1. Queues. Here, we compare the data that we have collected in Holbergskolen using the
white box method to Figure 9 above. From this data, we compute the time that each voter spent in
the polling place, by subtracting “check-in time” from the “ballot cast time”. Using the averaging
methods, we compute the running averages using a window size of 30 minutes and one hour, re-
spectively. We remark, that window size of 10 minutes did not provide usable information, in part
because of lack of observations. These two graphs are depicted in Figure 10 and Figure 11, using
the colors light blue (30 minutes), and gray (1 hour). The remaining three plots (green, blue, and
red) display the white box data for this polling place using the averaging method (see Section 6.4.1)
and Little’s method (see Section 6.4.2).
Fig. 10. Comparison of White Box (Averaging Method) and Manual Count in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
Fig. 11. Comparison of White Box (Little’s Method) and Manual Count in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
6.5.2. Devices. Here, we compare the second type of data that we have collected manually with
the data recorded using the white boxes. There is only one polling station, namely Holbergskolen,
for which we recorded inflow manually during the whole day. Figure 12 depicts the inflow and
outflow, recorded by our sensors in green and gray, respectively, and the inflow recorded manually
in red. Note, that we did not record manually the outflow of voters from a polling station.
Fig. 12. Device Flow in Polling Station Holbergskolen Copenhagen including manual count
Figure 13 presents the same information but in a slightly different form. The red plot describes
the average percentages of voters who carried a mobile phone, in 10 minute intervals.
Fig. 13. Device Capture Ratio from 8:30 to 20:10 in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
In addition to the inflow collected from Holbergskolen (Figure 14), we also recorded the inflow
for one hour period between 16:00 and 17:00 for three further polling places, including Bellahøj
Skole (Figure 15), Islands Brygge Skolen (Figure 16), and Møllevangskolen (Figure 17). This allows
us to compare the inflows between all four polling places during this hour.
Time Voters Devices Percentage
. . . . . . . . . . . .
16:00 - 16:10 80 29 36.25%
16:10 - 16:20 74 25 33.78%
16:20 - 16:30 97 27 27.84%
16:30 - 16:40 102 14 13.73%
16:40 - 16:50 108 27 25.00%
16:50 - 17:00 112 33 29.46%
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 14. Device Capture Ratio in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
Time Voters Devices Percentage
16:10 - 16:20 90 28 31.11%
16:20 - 16:30 85 33 38.82%
16:30 - 16:40 132 42 31.82%
16:40 - 16:50 122 43 35.25%
16:50 - 17:00 118 47 39.83%
17:00 - 17:10 130 48 36.92%
Fig. 15. Device Capture Ratio in Bellahøj Skole Copenhagen
Time Voters Devices Percentage
16:00 - 16:10 107 56 52.34%
16:10 - 16:20 183 77 42.08%
16:20 - 16:30 145 79 54.48%
16:30 - 16:40 200 84 42.00%
16:40 - 16:50 211 93 44.08%
16:50 - 17:00 193 88 45.60%
Fig. 16. Device Capture Ratio in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
Time Voters Devices Percentage
16:00 - 16:10 138 49 35.51%
16:10 - 16:20 160 64 40.00%
16:20 - 16:30 170 76 44.71%
16:30 - 16:40 173 76 43.93%
16:40 - 16:50 165 73 44.24%
16:50 - 17:00 201 83 41.29%
Fig. 17. Device Capture Ratio in Møllevangskolen Aarhus
7. FINDINGS
This section describes some preliminary findings – a detailed analysis of the data collected and
conclusions to be drawn in left to a different paper.
(1) The white box method provides a precise and accurate method to collect information for mea-
suring waiting times in polling places. We have observed and recorded data in one polling
station in two different ways, using our white box method and a manual counting method. Fig-
ure11 reports our observations. We can see that both data sets (green and light blue) follow
(roughly) the same trend, but that the automatic method recorded overall higher waiting times
than the manual method. We attribute this difference to that mobile phones are detected ear-
lier by our white box sensors because they record mobile phones while they are approaching
the polling station and not just when they arrived. To a lesser extent, it may also be due to the
inaccuracy inherent in manual data collection and the low sampling rate.
(2) Some polling places experienced an increase in waiting times between 16:00 and 18:00. For
example, at Islands Brygge Skolen waiting time doubled around 17:00. We suspect that this be-
cause many voters voted after work. To alleviate these service bottlenecks, our findings indicate
that either more registration desks or more curtains are needed. We can also refine the setup
to collect more detailed data, for example, by increasing the number of sensors, or by using
location algorithms, for example, trilateralization. It could even be possible to track individual
mobile phones or to predict where a line will form. Such extensions are beyond the scope of
this paper.
(3) The white box data can be also be used to analyze the percentages of the voting populations,
who have smartphones and this information can be correlated with voter participation. It is also
possible to conduct a further statistical analysis, for example by correlating our data with the
official voter registration data.
(4) Our findings also show that every polling station has a characteristic service time. This is the
minimal amount time a voter requires to traverse the polling station. In the Islands Brygge
Skolen polling station, the minimal service time is around 200 seconds, whereas in Bellahøj
Skole, it is closer to 270 seconds. Factors that effect the service time include polling station
layout and processing speed.
(5) In general, the averaging method and Little’s method provide very similar results, although
the latter appears to be more fine-grained. Especially the plots obtained by Little’s method in
the Figures above and the Appendix below show interesting periodic fluctuations, that we will
analyze in future work.
(6) Finally, not surprisingly, all polling places show a peak in waiting times at the beginning of
the voting day. We have observed long queues forming outside polling places, before they open.
When the voting started, and polling places have been operating for a little while at full capacity,
waiting times dropped dramatically.
(7) In Frederiksbjerg Hallerne (as shown in Appendix B, Figure 37), there is a dip in the graph
around 10am, which coincides with the malfunction of sensor No. 7 placed at the entrance at
the polling place, as discussed in Figure 3. This means that area covered by our sensors was
somewhat smaller during this time, resulting in reduced waiting times in this polling place.
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A. DEVICE APPEARANCE
Fig. 18. Device Appearance in Bellahøj Skole Copenhagen
Fig. 19. Device Appearance in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
Fig. 20. Device Appearance in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
Fig. 21. Device Appearance in Møllevangskolen Aarhus
Fig. 22. Device Appearance in Frederiksbjerg Hallerne Aarhus
B. AVERAGE WAITING TIME VIA AVERAGING METHOD
Fig. 23. Average Time (Averaging Method) in Bellahøj Skole Copenhagen
Fig. 24. Average Time (Averaging Method) in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
Fig. 25. Average Time (Averaging Method) in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
Fig. 26. Average Time (Averaging Method) in Møllevangskolen Aarhus
Fig. 27. Average Time (Averaging Method) in Frederiksbjerg Hallerne Aarhus
C. AVERAGE WAITING TIME VIA LITTLE’S METHOD
Fig. 28. Device Flow in Bellahøj Skole Copenhagen
Fig. 29. Average Time (Little’s Method) in Bellahøj Skole Copenhagen
Fig. 30. Device Flow in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
Fig. 31. Average Time (Little’s Method) in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
Fig. 32. Device Flow in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
Fig. 33. Average Time (Little’s Method) in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
Fig. 34. Device Flow in Møllevangskolen Aarhus
Fig. 35. Average Time (Little’s Method) in Møllevangskolen Aarhus
Fig. 36. Device Flow in Frederiksbjerg Hallerne Aarhus
Fig. 37. Average Time (Little’s Method) in Frederiksbjerg Hallerne Aarhus
